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for the Treatment of Myelomeningocele 
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Health Sciences Center: 
Observations Clinical and Ethical 
Rev. Dr. Michael Allsopp 
An associate professor in the Creighton University theology depart-
ment, Father Allsopp received his doctorate in theology summa cum laude 
from the Gregorian University in Rome. He has lectured widely and has 
numerous publications to his credit. 
With news of legal action against the Oklahoma University's Health 
Science Center, and the inevitable consequences of this suit on behalf of 
the 24 infants with spina bifida who were not recommended for active 
treatment, but allowed to die without benefit of surgery, antibiotics or 
sedation, the time seems opportune, before the nation's media heighten 
community emotions, to examine the crucial clinical and ethical basis of 
the OUHSC team's program as published (Pediatrics I ~83: 72: pp. 450-
458), and evaluate calmly, according to criteria which pass the tests of the 
whole community, their worth and soundness. This legal battle will excite 
passions and divide this nation. It has the ingredients of a Monday night 
movie. Its impact on law and medicine in America will be felt for years. For 
all of these reasons, prior to popular, partisan commentary, I hope this 
contribution will further the reflection among the health care communities 
closest, most involved - and with the most to lose and gain. 
The Selection Issue 
Spina bifida has existed throughout human history. Hippocrates was 
aware of the condition, and the teacher in Rembrandt's "The Anatomy 
Lesson" illustrated spina bifida in 1652 and gave it the name we use. In the 
treatment history of the condition as outlined by John Lorber,1 from the 
beginnings of the human race until the late 19th century, spina bifida was 
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not treated, as no procedure was seen as beneficial. The great majority of 
sufferers died in their infancy, as they did from the other scourges of 
newborns . 
Apart from some isolated efforts to treat the condition, it was not until 
the 1950s that advances in medical science, developments in antibiotics 
and neurosurgery, the introduction of the new shunt system by Holter, 
made active treatment productive. However, during that decade, since 
many infants still died of meningitis or other complications, a percentage 
only of the babies born each year with myelomeningocele received 
vigorous treatment. "Even in the most advanced neurosurgical centre in 
Boston," Lorber writes , "Ingraham and his colleagues (1944) operated on 
infants only if they had no serious neurological lesions and had survived 
for at least a year or 18 months from birth , and if their general condition 
was good" (p. 5). 
While in Sheffield (Children's Hospital) , the policy was introduced to 
treat more and more infants , and the results of this aggressive approach 
were felt around the world during the 50s-60s, selective treatment 
remained the general rule in some pediatric centers, as the reports of Hide 
(Oxford) ,2 Stark and Drummond (Edinburgh) ,3 Smith and Smith 
(Melbourne),4 Shurtleff et al. (Seattle) ,5 Woolraich,6 Feetham,7 Robertson,8 
all show. The natural history (the shunt-therapy, paralysis , mental 
retardation, bowel and bladder problems, the social, educational, marital 
implications), as described in Laurence's classic analysis , for instance, 
continued to deter the universal acceptance of a policy of automatically 
initiating aggressive care plans for all infants , pediatric advances 
notwithstanding.9 
It is against this background that we should assess the selection and 
treatment policy at Oklahoma's Health Sciences Center. Before looking at 
the OUHSC team's criteria for vigorous and supportive care, honesty 
demands we acknowledge that the Center's policy lies within a stream of 
philosophy and practice that has both long history and respectable allies . 
Further, fairness also demands we admit that even R. B. Zachary, one of 
the pioneers of aggressive treatment , and the consistent critic of Lorber's 
approach, does not advocate that surgery be performed on every child with 
spina bifida. "It may be asked whether I would advocate operation on 
every baby with spina bifid a," Zachary writes (Brit ish Medical Journal 
1977:2: 1460-1462). "Of course not. As with every aspect of surgery, there 
are criteria for selection, which should be based on sound medical and 
surgical principles and a knowledge of the prospects with and without 
surgery." Babies, in Zachary's charge, with severe intracranial hemorrhage 
or another major life-threatening anomaly, for instance, would not receive 
surgery because it would have no bearing at all upon whether these infants 
lived or died. The traditional rule about futile treatment wisely applies. 
The Criteria Issue 
One distressing fact about the OUHSC published report is the repeated 
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admission that the myelomeningocele team reached its consensus 
decisions without precise clinical criteria for vigorous or simply supportive 
care. "Whereas there are no specific criteria for treatment, factors 
considered significant by Shurtleff et al (and to a lesser extent, those 
considered significant by Lorber) are reviewed. Usually a consensus is 
achieved, but sometimes the team is ambivalent. In this instance, a 
recommendation for treatment is made ," runs the relevant section. 
Whether all the selection criteria proposed by Shurtleff in 1974 are 
considered decisive remains unclear, as does also why the specific factors 
Lorber presented are significant only "to a lesser extent." While the three 
case reports included in the study refer to "severe congenital 
hydrocephalus and an L-llevel of paralysis at birth," (the other two cases 
mention "congenital hydrocephalus and a large thoracolumbar sac" and a 
male infant with "a T -10 level of paralysis and congenital hydrocephalus at 
birth") , detailed reasons , charts and graphs are disappointingly missing. 
Exactly why supportive care was recommended for 33 babies (the major 
adverse clinical criteria) remains unclear. 
Serious questions abound. "Why did they recommend only supportive 
care for these children (five children with L-5 sacral lesions)?" specialist 
John Freeman, Birth Defects Center, Johns Hopkins Hospital, asks. 10 
This lack of scientific rigor, the incomplete presentation of the degree of 
severity and incidence of complication that we find in Laurence, Lorber, 
Shurtleff, the reports of Smith and Smith, Hunt et aI., II and Sherman 
Stein, Schut and Ames, 12 as well as the failure to present all their working 
criteria, are hard to understand , and one well appreciates Freeman's 
strong comments, and the words of Nat Hentoff about "a death row for 
infants in Oklahoma." 13 One hopes that the myelomeningocele team will 
publish its criteria for selection in full , together with its rationale for 
prioritizing, excluding and including clinical factors in its evaluations. 
The Decision Making Issue , 
The OUHSC report does give information about key aspects of the 
team's approach : its method of making treatment decisions; the actual 
membership and structure of the team both in theory and practice. We are 
told something about the difficulties the team faced in combat. First, the 
tea m is made up of a physician's assistant , acting as full-time program 
coordinator, a pediatrician, an orthopedist, a neurosurgeon, a urologist , a 
nurse clinician, a social worker, physical and occupational therapists, and 
a psychologist. One of the physicians is chief of the program. Certainly, 
such a group possesses the range of medical knowledge and expertise not 
only to provide data for highly reliable recommendations, but also for 
efficient ones. Decisions, the report mentions, are made by consensus, and 
communicated to fa mily by several members of the team as a group: "One 
physician accompanied by the coordinator, social worker, and / or nurse." 
Furthermore, regular contact with the family aftet it has elected to defer 
surgery, is maintained by the clinic coordinator and social worker. 
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In day-to-day life, however, this approach, structure and decision 
making method had real problems. "Usually a consensus is achieved, but 
sometimes the team is ambivalent ," the report states. Also, we are told , 
"occasionally, a decision was made in what could be considered, in 
retrospect, an inadequate assessment." In the second case report, we are 
informed, "a rapid evaluation was made. Only two of the team members 
(which two?) saw the baby, and no input from Social Services was 
obtained." Most disconcerting, moreover, is the following: "with the 
number of diverse personnel involved, differences do occur in decision 
making and the approach is not uniform from one case to the next. 
However, the alternatives of a dogmatic protocol or an incomplete 
evaluation by less than all services involved appeared to us to be 
unsatisfactory choices" (p. 455). 
John Freeman has severely criticized these admissions , the claims that 
the approach is "workable" and results in assessments that are "reasonably 
accurate." The admitted lack of uniformity is a maj or cause of concern, I 
concur. Although treatment decisions are often a mix of imperfect science 
and human art, any approach to them should embody maximum 
consistency, as little arbitrariness as professional responsibilities demand. 
A uniform approach to the treatment of spina bifida, AIDS or cancer need 
not imply either of the alternatives the report mentions. Moreover, in the 
actual contents of the negative recommendations, the report contains 
difficulties not mentioned by Freeman, which provide further cause for 
comment. 
"If the team's assessment is pessimistic," the report states, "the family is 
informed that we do not consider them obligated to have the baby treated . 
They are given time to assess the inform'ation before they reach a decision" 
(p. 452). Surely, there is something wrong with this statement, especially 
the phrase, " . .. we do not consider them obligated to have the baby 
treated." Has a medical team the right to make such a recommendation? Is 
this a communication of a clinical evaluation and an agreed medical 
judgment or something different? Personally, I consider s ch a statement 
not only a serious usurpation of parental authority, but a classic example 
of medical paternalism at its worst. Parents should be assisted with their 
feelings of guilt , as Cohen advises. 14 However, such support should not, I 
believe, distort the physician-patient roles . 
The thrust , the implied control , furthermore , clearly undermines the 
team's stated belief that parents rather than the team's experts in the field 
of myelomeningoceles are the real decision-makers. The team acts , so the 
report states, upon the parents' decision. Aggressive treatment will be 
given should parents request or insist , in spite of a pessimistic assessment 
by the team, and presumably, supportive treatment will be given to a child 
when parents ask, in spite of an optimistic recommendation. 15 Is this, 
whatever the nation's feeling about parent rights, a sound decision-making 
policy? John Lorber has written, "Who should make the decision totreat or 
not to treat? Most consider that it is the doctor's duty. The doctor should 
February, 1986 59 
be a consultant and an expert in this field of medicine (Ellis, 1974). 
Without such a proviso, disastrous mistakes may be committed . One 
cannot leave the decision to junior staff. One cannot leave it to the parents 
because they are hardly ever sufficiently informed and because they are 
under severe emotional strain at the time . .. Of course, the parents' 
wishes must be taken into account , though usually they will ask the 
doctor's advice, even if the doctor appears to leave the decision to them."16 
As all who have viewed the educational video , "Born Dying" or assisted 
parents of spina bifida infants, should agree, there is wisdom in these 
words, even if they run counter to the stream of legal and medical 
inclinations in the US and Britain today.1 7 
The Philosophical and Ethical Issues 
The OUHSC report does not deal with basic philosophical issues , but 
rather with such matters as whether the team's program is workable, 
whether it addresses , in a reasonable fashion the current ethical dilemma 
concerning the treatment of spina bifida infants. However, often it 
implicitly deals with such issues as the purpose of medicine and the social 
responsibilities of health care professionals. Decisions not to treat 
aggressively reflect attitudes about life and death , the meaning and 
purpose of health and illness. Indirectly, at least to some degree, those who 
make such judgments are expressing convictions about society, authority, 
science and civilization. In making a decision about treatment, expressly 
not to treat a baby with an L-5 sacral lesion whom (it must be presumed) 
one knows to have the potential for "normal" if restricted life, given the 
advances which have taken place in special education, etc., during the 
70S,18 do we not see definite signs of significant philosophical ideas at 
work? Nevertheless, since the team s report does not address such ideas 
specifically, all comments are hazardous , and best wait until the court 
proceedings or later team-publications. The moral aspects ofthis program 
and decision making, however, are expressly addressed . 
The report considers the following: i) who should make the decision 
about treatment and upon what data base; ii) what is the soundness of 
Shaw's formulation of the quality of life, with its emphasis on the societal 
factors ; iii) how should babies for whom only supportive care is 
recommended be cared for ; iv) the compatibility of the team's approach 
with the thought of Jesuit ethicist, Richard A. McCormick. Nowhere -
and it is rather surprising in the American context - does the report raise 
the issue of rights, or the responsibilities of communities toward members. 
Nowhere does this final section of the report discuss such matters as 
extraordinary or heroic measures in the context of spina bifida, the just 
distribution of medical / community resources, or this society'S growing 
concern about hard cases in which the benefits are doubtful. 
One cannot be involved with cancer, alcoholism or myelomeningocele 
without being aware of the financial , emotional, marital stress these 
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conditions impose upon spouses and families. To what degree, however, 
should the impact of such stress upon next-of-kin influence treatment 
decisions? Should our treatment of people with identical symptoms, age, 
general circumstances, be quite different depending upon their support-
systems, whether a patient is a widow without children or married , 50, with 
strong family ties? For the OUHSC team, the home and society factors are 
crucial in any decision about vigorous or supportive care. Patently 
influenced by Anthony Shaw's controversial formulation of the quality of 
life (QL = NE x (H + S), where NE represents the patient's natural 
endowment, H stands for the contribution from home and family, S is the 
contribution from society) , in spite of the strong criticisms of Paul 
Ramsey, among others, the report states, "The treatment for babies with 
identical 'selection criteria' could be quite different, depending on the 
contribution from home and society."19 Thus, an infant born to a black 
single-parent who is on ADC already, who comes from a country or state 
short of welfare funds, will be treated quite differently, one must assume, 
from a baby born to white, upper-middle-class parents who have medical 
insurance, strong family support, stable marriage and live in a state less 
hard hit by Reagan welfare cuts. While it is not hard to understand the 
reasoning and conclusion, something seems to be seriously faulty in this 
application of situation ethics. 
The team's decision to build its moral basis upon the 1974 J AMA study, 
"To save or let die," by Richard McCormick, was unfortunate. In 1983, 
McCormick published another study in which he changed, clearly 
restricted the implications of some of his earlier views. McCormick's new 
position expressly sets limits on the use of his ideas as applied and 
implemented in centers like OUHSC. 20 In the first study we do find the 
principle presented as a primary guideline in decision making, namely, 
"the potential of the patient for human relationships." McCormick did 
state that if the potential is simply nonexistent "or would be utterly 
submerged and underdeveloped in the mere struggle to s rvive," that life 
can be considered as having achieved its potential and (one presumes), 
allowed to come to its end. Among his caveats, however, McCormick 
cautioned against using the principle like a slide rule , applying it from 
anencephalic to Down's babies . 
In his 1983 study (published while the OUHSC report was awaiting its 
appearance in Pediatrics), McCormick visibly restricted the use of his 
principle. Life-saving interventions ought not to be omitted for managerial 
or institutional reasons , he states, or because of the inability of a particular 
family to cope with a badly disabled infant. "N 0 one ought to be allowed to 
die," McCormick writes, "simply because these parents are not up to the 
task . At this point society has certain responsibilities. 
A major limitation cited by McCormick is that life-sustaining 
interventions may not be omitted simply because the baby is retarded. 
Only where there is excessive hardship on the patient , especially when this 
is combined with poor prognosis, or when it becomes clear that expected 
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life can be had for a relatively short time and only with the use of continued 
artificial feeding , does McCormick see that intervention may be omitted . 
Further, throughout this study McCormick insists that the best interests of 
the infant are central, and outweigh all other considerations. The proper 
welfare of a baby should take precedence over the wishes and decisions of 
parents, and should provide society with a legitimate basis for direct 
intervention . In view of these firm statements, the OU HSC team's thinking 
can be considered as only remotely aligned with McCormick's approach 
and categorically contravenes his recent specifications. 
Before moving to the legal aspects raised by this report, the fact the 
OU HSC myelomeningocele team recommended supportive treatment for 
24 infants during the period July I, 1977 - June 30, 1982, the following 
question must be asked , "As we look back at the ethical heritage of this 
Republic and study the moral philosophies respected in this society, what 
sound, intellectually satisfying reasons can be produced for maintaining 
that a baby born today with such adverse criteria as L-S sacral lesion , 
hydrocephalus , other tell-tale signs of severe spina bifida - not major 
intracranial hemorrhage or obvious symptoms that death is imminent and 
impossible to prevent - should be allowed to die? Is it defensible to argue 
that it may be permitted to die since its life (spent at the age of 10, should it 
live that long, in a wheelchair, aided , perhaps by calipers, with any 
hydrocephalus controlled by a valve system etc., as Zachary writes in his 
"Life with Spina Bifida," British Medical Journal, 1977:2: 1460-1462), is 
not worth living and it is better off in heaven? Is it right to allow it to die 
because its parents decide it should? Finally, is it ethically sound to justify 
such a death on the grounds that a pediatric specialist / team judges the 
parents to lack adequate financial , emotional or community support to 
provide properly for the infant, and determine it ought to be allowed to die 
from non-treatment? 
Such questions will always divide the health care community, especially 
when some give ultimate value to the overall good of ~heir actions , while 
others stand with the growing .number who hold rights: the right to live; the 
right to health care sufficient to protect that life; the right to access to 
health care for all , regardless of ability to pay; as ultimate principles in 
treatment decision making. In today's pluralistic society, when 
recommendations are made by team consensus as at OUHSC, a consulting 
pediatrician, faced with debate over reliable clinical criteria, parents 
opposed to aggressive treatment, plus the reality of a report from hospital 
social services that a mother lacks emotional maturity to deal well with her 
infant, may be justified in thinking he is dealing with a genuine dilemma. In 
reality the truly wise and most compassionate path - the moral course 
- may be less hard to decide. 
In Nebraska, for example, Jack Trembath, spina bifida consultant , St. 
Joseph's Hospital, Creighton University and University of Nebraska 
Medical Center, Omaha, has little trouble in finding foster parents when 
an infant's natural parents are unwilling or unable to provide care. Jim 
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Miedaner, director of Physical Therapy, Meyer Children's Rehabilitation 
Institute, has strengthened an impressive program that maximizes 
mobility, independence, educational achievement. 
With the technology now available, the antibiotics, the advances in 
physical therapy and special education (I refer especially to the 1985 report 
of Sherman et at and their eight-week program for teenagers with spina 
bifida which showed better than expected, outcomes in areas such as 
consolidating identity, achieving independence, establishing satisfying 
interpersonal relationships, finding a vocation), one wonders whether it is 
just and beneficent, the "good" thing in terms of the Hippocratic Oath, to 
recommend that an infant now born in Omaha with spina bifida (L-5 
sacral lesion, etc., as described above) should receive simply passive 
treatment. 
As the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics stated, 
ambiguities and differences of opinion should not preclude consensus on 
some ethical principles, in particular, the most basic of all for health care 
providers, namely, that one's primary obligation is to the child-patient, 
and that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is justified 
only when such a course serves the interests of that child. We may not be 
able to accept that the actual limited potential of the child or the present 
lack of community resources are "irrevelant" in making treatment 
decisions (as the 1 oint Policy Statement of the Academy maintains), but 
we should be agreed that the infant's medical condition should be our 
focus throughout. 
Hard cases, however, will be debated , forever, and certainly as the 
OUHSC case comes to trial. While an ethics report under the auspices of 
the Newcastle Regional Hospital Board concluded in 1975 that "the list of 
initial adverse criteria set out by Lorber, provides a sufficient basis for ... 
selection," (the Lord Bishop of Durham and the president of Ushaw 
College were members of the working party) I seriously doubt whether our 
gu'ardians and protectors of the weak, underprivileged, and less fortunate 
in this community ought to be moved by arguments, wherper "quality of 
life" or "social benefit," which destroy or violate the Constitutional 
foundations and customs of this democracy.21 To borrow a line from 
Richard McCormick, any general guideline, any set of arguments which 
does not embody mercy and compassion for the neighbor in greatest need 
is nothing but a racism of the adult, the healthy, the fittest, and eventually a 
source of corrosion of the humanity and civilization of those who sit in 
courts and congresses. 
The Legal Issue 
According to Dennis 1. Horan and Burke 1. Balch, the debate over the 
respective roles and rights of the state and parents in decision-making 
about children has been long settIed. 22 "The state," they write, "in the 
exercise of its parens patriae power, has always had the authority to 
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intervene on behalf of the best interests of the child" (p . 45). The crux of the 
controversy is over the best interests of a handicapped. a spina bifida child. 
for example. In the judgment of Martin Gerry, HEW director of the Office 
for Civil Rights, 1975-77, the facts stated in the OUHSC report indicate a 
clear violation of state and federal law, of child-abuse statutes and criminal 
laws. "I think what you have here," writes Gerry, "is a conspiracy to 
commit murder."23 If this legal opinion does have validity, then the court 
proceedings will be most significant. The central issues, however, will be 
hard fought. 
First , there is the issue of whether children born with severe disabilities 
are protected under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, especially if, 
as may be argued by the attorneys for OUHSC, they are "dying" or lack 
sufficient criteria or potential to be legally called "persons." On the adverse 
clinical criteria issue, the well-publicized opinion of Dr. David McLone, 
chief of pediatric neurosurgery, Chicago Children's Memorial Hospital , 
that physicians are making decisions not to treat aggressively on the basis 
of invalid criteria will have weight, as will comments like Freeman's about 
the OUHSC's day-to-day procedures for determining treatment decisions. 
On the other side, OUHSC's clinical criteria will be strongly defended, as 
will the argument that supportive treatment, when rightly determined, is in 
the best interests of the baby, as the editors of the British Medical Journal 
have argued more than once. The case will hinge on issues of fact; for 
instance, what were the crucial factors in the decisions about the 24 infants 
who did not receive vigorous treatment, who made the clinical assessments 
in these cases, what specific tests were completed, what do the records 
show about the severity of the spina bifida, and of course, the force of 
social and family factors in the recommendations against aggressive 
treatment. The legal aspects, the specific readings of state and federal 
statutes, may be less unclear now that Congress has settled its 1984 Child 
Abuse Prevention Act discussions. 
Personally, it would appear from the report that the OUHSC team did 
fail to meet some standards of competence in making Ja number of their 
decisions about treatment. On its own admission, the team was greatly 
influenced in its final recommendations by Shaw's suspect quality of life 
equation. Whether the team was guilty of culpable negligence or violated 
the legal rights of infants in such instances can be decided only after all the 
facts and arguments have been presented. Whatever the final judgments, 
one hopes that justice not only will be done - to all involved - but will be 
seen to be done.24 
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